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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the design of artificial-
noise-aided secure multi-antenna transmission in slow fading
channels. The primary design concerns include the transmit
power allocation and the rate parameters of the wiretap code.
We consider two scenarios with different complexity levels: i) the
design parameters are chosen to be fixed for all transmissions,
ii) they are adaptively adjusted based on the instantaneous
channel feedback from the intended receiver. In both scenarios,
we provide explicit design solutions for achieving the maximal
throughput subject to a secrecy constraint, given by a maximum
allowable secrecy outage probability. We then derive accurate
approximations for the maximal throughput in both scenarios in
the high signal-to-noise ratio region, and give new insights into
the additional power cost for achieving a higher security level,
whilst maintaining a specified target throughput. In the end,
the throughput gain of adaptive transmission over non-adaptive
transmission is also quantified and analyzed.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, multi-antenna transmis-
sion, artificial noise, power allocation, secrecy outage probability,
throughput optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid development of wireless technology,an ever-increasing amount of sensitive data (e.g., pri-
vate conversation, credit card information) is transmitted over
wireless networks. However, the broadcasting nature of the
wireless medium makes it especially vulnerable to malicious
interception. Currently, cryptographic algorithms, typically
designed without exploiting the physical properties of the
wireless medium, are used to keep broadcasted messages
confidential. For such techniques, although the expenditure of
interception may be very high, providing robust encryption
algorithms is becoming ever more challenging, due to the
continuing development of computing devices. By taking the
physical properties of the wireless channels into consideration,
the recently developed physical-layer security techniques can
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guarantee secure transmission regardless of the eavesdrop-
per’s computational capability. As such, these techniques have
drawn a lot of recent attention from the research community.
A. Background and Previous Work
The notion of perfect secrecy was first introduced by Shan-
non [1]. Subsequently, pioneering works on physical-layer
security [2, 3] proved that there exist coding schemes which
can ensure transmission reliability and perfect secrecy simulta-
neously. Many recent papers have expanded upon these initial
contributions, considering different system configurations and
assumptions. Particularly, multi-antenna techniques have been
extensively studied as a means for achieving security enhance-
ments [4–8]. However, in much of the literature on physical-
layer security, the eavesdropper’s channel state information
(CSI) was assumed to be available at the transmitter, which is
usually impractical. To relax this strong assumption, the au-
thors in [9] proposed a multi-antenna transmission scheme that
inserts artificial noise into the transmitted signal in a controlled
manner, thus to confuse the malicious eavesdropper. This
transmission scheme requires the instantaneous CSI feedback
from the intended receiver, but not the eavesdropper, which is
a major advancement toward practical secure communications.
Building on the ideas from [9], the design and analysis of
artificial-noise-aided transmission has been further studied for
both fast and slow fading channels [10–16]. For fast fading
channels, the channel coherence time is much shorter than the
codeword length and the ergodic secrecy rate is often used as
the performance metric for designing beamforming and power
allocation strategies [10–12]. For slow fading channels, the
channel coherence time is usually longer than the codeword
length, and in such scenarios outage-based formulations be-
come more appropriate. To this end, various secrecy outage
formulations were proposed first in [17, 18] and recently
in [19, 20]. In particular, the first formulation developed in [17,
18] has been used for studying artificial-noise-aided multi-
antenna transmission schemes in [13–16]. This secrecy outage
formulation characterizes the possibility of having a secure
and reliable transmission, without distinguishing secrecy from
reliability. In other words, a secrecy outage event defined
therein may occur due to either an insecure link to the eaves-
dropper or an unreliable link to the intended receiver. To better
assist the secure transmission design, revised secrecy outage
formulations were independently developed in [19] and [20].
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2In these revised outage formulations, a secrecy outage event
arises solely due to an insecure link to the eavesdropper;
thus, the secrecy and reliability performance can be measured
separately. These revised secrecy outage formulations can be
utilized to obtain a better understanding and more practically-
oriented designs for the artificial-noise-aided secure multi-
antenna transmission.
B. Our Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we provide new design guidelines for artificial-
noise-aided secure multi-antenna transmission in slow fading
channels, based on the recently developed secrecy outage
formulation in [20]. This formulation allows us to measure
the secrecy and reliability performance for any given rate
parameters of the wiretap code. In turn, we are able to set the
rate parameters to achieve a target secrecy level, given by a
maximum allowable secrecy outage probability. To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, no prior work on artificial-noise-aided
multi-antenna transmission has considered the rate parameters
of the wiretap code as design parameters.
Our main contributions include explicit design solutions
and new performance analysis results for the throughput-
maximizing transmission schemes with either fixed-rate or
adaptive-rate encoder, under a constraint on the level of
secrecy. The design concerns include the rate parameters of
the wiretap code, as well as the transmit power allocation
between the information-bearing signal and the artificial noise.
We consider two scenarios with different system complexities:
• In the first scenario, the design parameters are optimized
off-line and remain fixed for all transmissions. We divide
our design into two steps: The first step minimizes the
transmission delay for a given data rate, while the second
step maximizes the average throughput. In the first step,
closed-form solutions are derived for the optimal system
parameters and the secrecy-delay tradeoff for fixed-rate
transmission is captured. In the second step, the average
throughput is maximized by numerically optimizing the
data rate with the optimal designs of all other system
parameters already given in closed form. To obtain
further analytical insights, we derive a high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) approximation of the optimal data rate
to maximize the average throughput. Focusing on the
high SNR region, we further investigate the additional
power cost incurred by imposing or strengthening the
secrecy constraint, while guaranteeing a specified target
throughput.
• In the second scenario, the design parameters are dy-
namically adjusted based on the instantaneous channel
feedback from the intended receiver. We provide an
analytical solution to the optimal system parameters that
maximize the achievable data rate for each realization of
the intended channel, under the secrecy constraint, such
that the average throughput is also maximized. In the high
SNR region, we present accurate approximations for the
maximal throughput, which enable us to study the addi-
tional power cost incurred by imposing or strengthening
the secrecy constraint, while achieving a specified target
throughput. Finally, we analyze the throughput gain of
adaptive-rate transmission over fixed-rate transmission.
Whilst doing adaptation is always beneficial in terms of
increasing the throughput, our analysis shows that in the
high SNR region, the throughput gain is most significant
when the number of transmit antennas is small. Moreover,
we show that the throughput gain brought by doing
adaption is not very sensitive to the required secrecy level.
We point out that, similar to our work, a very recent contri-
bution [21] also used a secrecy outage formulation along the
lines of [19, 20] to study artificial-noise-aided multi-antenna
transmission. The main focus therein was to minimize the
power consumption for given levels of secrecy and quality-
of-service performance, while the transmission rates were not
part of the design consideration. In contrast, we consider a
transmission system with a fixed transmit power, and optimize
the rate parameters of the wiretap code as well as the transmit
power allocation to maximize the average throughput, subject
to (s.t.) a secrecy outage constraint.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRIC
We consider the transmission from Alice to Bob in the
presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Alice is equipped with
multiple transmit antennas (N ≥ 2) while Bob and Eve each
has one receive antenna. Thus, the channel from Alice to Bob
is multiple-input and single-output (MISO). We assume a non-
line-of-sight rich scattering environment, and as such, model
all channels as uncorrelated Rayleigh fading. It is also assumed
that Bob can estimate his channel accurately and use a perfect
feedback link to inform Alice about his instantaneous CSI.
This feedback link is not secure and can be intercepted by Eve.
We further assume that the coherence time is long enough to
support the wiretap code [2] and the time used for learning
the channel and feeding back the CSI is negligible. Assuming
Eve is a passive eavesdropper, the instantaneous CSI of Eve
is thereby unavailable to Alice.
The N dimensional symbol vector to be transmitted is
defined as x and the received signal at Bob is given by
yb = h
Tx + nb , (1)
where the N × 1 vector h is the channel fading gain from
Alice to Bob and nb is the receiver noise at Bob. The entries
of h and nb are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean complex Gaussian variables with
unit variance.
Similarly, the received signal at Eve is given by
ye = g
Tx + ne , (2)
where the N×1 vector g captures the channel fading gain from
Alice to Eve and ne is the receiver noise at Eve. The entries
of g are assumed to be i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian
variables each with variance σ2g .
A. Transmit Beamforming with Artificial Noise Generation
The authors in [9] introduced the concept of generating
artificial noise to guarantee secure transmission. The key idea
3is outlined as follows. Alice generates an orthonormal basis
of CN as W = [w1 W2], where w1 = h∗/||h||. Then she
mixes some artificial noise with the message symbol u as
x = w1u+ W2v ,
where u is complex Gaussian distributed and v is the artificial
noise vector.
With this beamforming strategy, by (1) and (2), the received
signal at Bob becomes
yb = h
Tw1u+ h
TW2v + nb = ||h||u+ nb , (3)
while the received signal at Eve becomes
ye = g
Tw1u+ g
TW2v + ne = g1u+ g
T
2 v + ne , (4)
where g1 = gTw1 and gT2 = g
TW2.
The total transmit power available at Alice is denoted as P .
The power allocation ratio Φ is defined as the fraction of the
information-bearing signal power to the total transmit power.
Thus, the variance of u is set to PΦ. By (3), it is clear
that Alice is performing maximal ratio transmission on the
channel to Bob and the instantaneous effective channel gain
is ||h||2. Therefore, the instantaneous channel capacity to Bob
is Cb = log2
(
1 + PΦ||h||2
)
, where ||h||2 ∼ Gamma (N, 1).
The complementary cumulative distribution function (c.c.d.f.)
of ||h||2 is F¯||h||2(r) = Γ˜ (N, r), where Γ˜ (·, ·) is the regu-
larized upper incomplete gamma function. All transmit power
not allocated to u is equally assigned to the N − 1 entries of
v, due to the absence of Eve’s CSI. Therefore, the entries of
v are set to be i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian variables
each with variance σ2v =
P (1−Φ)
N−1 . The power allocation ratio
Φ may be dynamically adjusted based on h.
Since the noise power at Eve is typically unknown to Alice,
a robust approach, as done in [10], is to design for the worst-
case scenario and assume that there is no receiver noise at
Eve (i.e., ne = 0). Therefore, from (4), for a given realization
of the channel fading gains (i.e., h and g), the instantaneous
SNR at Eve is given by
γe =
|g1|2σ2u
||g2||2σ2v
=
N − 1
Φ−1 − 1
|g1|2
||g2||2 .
Since g has i.i.d. complex Gaussian entries each with variance
σ2g and W is unitary, g
TW = [g1 g2] also has i.i.d. complex
Gaussian entries each with variance σ2g . Using [22, Eq. 19],
the c.c.d.f. of γe can be characterized as
F¯γe (γe) =
(
1 + γe
(
Φ−1 − 1
N − 1
))1−N
. (5)
As N → ∞, this converges to the c.c.d.f. of an exponential
distribution with mean Φ1−Φ . Note that if Φ is adaptively
adjusted based on h, the distribution of the received SNR at
Eve would be changed dynamically.
B. Secure Transmission and Throughput
Using the well-known wiretap code [2], data is encoded
before transmission. The rates of the transmitted codeword and
the secret message are denoted as Rb and Rs, respectively. In
this paper, we refer to the rates Rb and Rs as the rate param-
eters of the wiretap code. The rate redundancy Re , Rb −Rs
is intentionally added in order to provide secrecy against
eavesdropping. If the instantaneous channel capacity to Eve
Ce = log2 (1 + γe) is larger than Re, perfect secrecy cannot
be achieved and a secrecy outage is deemed to occur.
We consider an on-off transmission scheme [20] where
Alice decides to transmit or not, based on her knowledge of
Bob’s channel h. To be specific, Alice transmits only if the
effective channel gain ||h||2 exceeds a threshold µ. As will
be seen, this on-off scheme is adopted to prevent undesirable
transmissions which incur capacity outages (i.e., Rb > Cb) or
unacceptably high risk of secrecy outage (which occurs when
Ce > Re). With the on-off transmission strategy, the transmit
probability is
ptx (µ) = F¯||h||2 (µ) = Γ˜ (N,µ) . (6)
Since the channel fading gain changes from time to time, Alice
would transmit once the effective channel gain exceeds the
preselected threshold (i.e., ||h||2 > µ). In this way, the value
of the transmit probability ptx is directly related to the average
delay, i.e., the larger ptx, the shorter the expected delay.
Since the rates of the wiretap code may be adaptively
adjusted based on Bob’s channel feedback, the rates Rb and
Rs are potentially functions of h. The average throughput is
then defined as
η = Eh [Rs (h)] (bits/channel use) , (7)
where Rs (h) = 0 for ||h||2 ≤ µ, as a consequence of the on-
off transmission protocol. Note that this throughput definition
is meaningful only when: i) the risk of secrecy outage is under
control, ii) the intended receiver can decode the messages
correctly. As will be seen later, our designs can satisfy these
two conditions simultaneously; thus, it is meaningful to apply
this throughput definition.
C. Secrecy Performance Characterization
From (5), it is clear that changing the power allocation
would effectively alter the distribution of the received SNR
at Eve. With on-off transmission, for a given h, if ||h||2 > µ,
Alice would specify three parameters: Rb (h), Rs (h) and
Φ (h) for transmission; otherwise, she stops transmission.
Therefore, the secrecy outage probability is given by
pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h))
=
{
Pr (Ce (Φ (h)) > Rb (h)−Rs (h)) if ||h||2 > µ ,
0 other ,
where
Pr (Ce (Φ (h)) > Rb (h)−Rs (h))
=
(
1 +
(
2Rb(h)−Rs(h) − 1
)(Φ−1 (h)− 1
N − 1
))1−N
, (8)
evaluated from (5).
Since we assumed that ne = 0, the above-mentioned pso
is an upper bound on the actual secrecy outage probability. It
4depends on the power allocation ratio Φ, but not the transmit
power P .
The overall secrecy outage probability of this transmission
system is given by
p¯so = E
[
pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h)) | ||h||2 > µ
]
. (9)
In sequel, we consider the optimization of the throughput
performance, given a maximum allowable secrecy outage
probability .
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
WITH NON-ADAPTIVE ENCODER
In this section, we consider the scenario where a single
codebook is used by Alice and Bob, thus Rb and Rs are
carefully chosen to have fixed values which do not change with
h. In addition, the value of Φ is also optimized off-line and
remains fixed. We refer to this as the non-adaptive encoding
(NAE) scheme.
The primary design objective is to meet the secrecy require-
ment given on the secrecy outage probability. For the NAE
scheme, the design parameters Rb, Rs and Φ have fixed values
for all transmissions (i.e., they do not change with h); thus,
(8) becomes independent of h. Consequently, the conditional
expectation in (9) can be ignored, and the overall secrecy
outage probability p¯so in this case is described by (8). In
other words, for the NAE scheme, the overall secrecy outage
probability is a function of Rb, Rs and Φ, and the secrecy
requirement can be written as p¯so (Rb, Rs,Φ) ≤ .
Meanwhile, as already mentioned, on-off transmission with
threshold µ is adopted to prevent undesirable transmissions
which incur capacity outages at Bob. When Alice decides to
transmit (i.e., ||h||2 > µ), the channel capacity to Bob is
Cb = log2
(
1 + PΦ||h||2) > log2 (1 + PΦµ) .
Thus, with Rb satisfying Rb ≤ log2 (1 + PΦµ), the transmit-
ted messages can be decoded at Bob with an arbitrarily low
error probability.
From (6) and (7), the throughput of the NAE scheme is
given by
ηNAE = ptx (µ)×Rs . (10)
Now we consider throughput optimization of this NAE scheme
under the secrecy constraint. Combining the above discussions,
the throughput optimization problem is posed as follows:
max
µ,Rb,Rs,Φ
ptx (µ)×Rs
s.t. p¯so (Rb, Rs,Φ) ≤  ,
Rb ≤ log2 (1 + PΦµ) ,
0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rb ,
0 ≤ Φ ≤ 1 ,
0 ≤ µ . (11)
We solve the problem in two steps. In the first step, we fix
Rs and maximize ptx (µ) with respect to (w.r.t.) µ, Rb and Φ.
Since Rs is fixed, by maximizing ptx, this step can be viewed
as a delay-minimizing design, while satisfying the secrecy
constraint. With a minor abuse of notation, the maximal ptx
for a given Rs is denoted as pmaxtx (Rs), where µ is optimized
already. Then, in the second step, we consider the throughput
maximization, i.e., maximizing pmaxtx (Rs)×Rs w.r.t. Rs.
A. Delay Minimization
From (11), the delay minimization problem is posed as
max
µ,Rb,Φ
ptx (µ)
s.t. p¯so (Rb,Φ) ≤  ,
Rb ≤ log2 (1 + PΦµ) ,
Rs ≤ Rb ,
0 ≤ Φ ≤ 1 ,
0 ≤ µ . (12)
To simplify the expressions throughout the paper, we define
the quantity:
λ (,N) := (N − 1)
(

1
1−N − 1
)
. (13)
The solution to (12) is presented as follows, while the deriva-
tion is relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. With a non-adaptive encoder, for a prescribed
message rate Rs and under the secrecy constraint p¯so ≤ , the
maximal transmit probability in (12) leading to the minimal
average delay is given by:
pmaxtx = Γ˜
(
N,
1
P
(√
2Rsλ (,N) +
√
2Rs − 1
)2)
. (14)
This is achieved with the following choice of system param-
eters:
Φ∗ =
√
2Rs − 1√
2Rsλ (,N) +
√
2Rs − 1 , (15)
R∗b = Rs + log2
(√
(1− 2−Rs)λ (,N) + 1
)
, (16)
µ∗ =
2R
∗
b − 1
PΦ∗
.
From (15) and (16), several observations can be made:
• R∗b and Φ
∗ are independent of P . This is explained by
noting that with the zero-noise assumption of Eve, the
secrecy outage probability depends only on Rb and Φ.
Therefore, for a given Φ, whether the secrecy constraint
can be satisfied depends only on Rb. Since the latter
optimization w.r.t. Φ also does not involve P , the in-
dependence is then observed.
• Φ∗ increases with N (since λ (,N) decreases with N ,
as shown in Appendix B), approaching the constant:
lim
N→∞
Φ∗ =
1
1 +
√
ln
(
1

)
/ (1− 2−Rs)
.
This result follows the intuition that when more transmit
antennas are installed, a smaller fraction of power can be
used for generating artificial noise while still ensuring the
required security level.
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The points above focus on the optimal system parameters.
Some useful insights regarding the system performance and
design implications may also be concluded:
• For a given transmission system (i.e., given N and P ) and
a prescribed message rate Rs, the optimal tradeoff curve
between the secrecy and delay performance is completely
specified by (14). This is observed by noting that pmaxtx is
achieved when p¯so = , while varying  effectively traces
the optimal tradeoff. In [23], we considered the mini-
mization of the overall secrecy outage probability under
an average delay constraint (i.e., min p¯so s.t. ptx ≥ δ),
which is the symmetric problem to (12). Since the
tradeoff curve obtained in [23] coincides with (14), we
conclude that each point on the optimal tradeoff curve is
Pareto optimal [24]. As shown in Fig. 1, the area under
each curve represents the feasible region of (p¯so, ptx),
points of which are achievable.
• If the system is designed to operate under a joint secrecy
and delay constraint (i.e., p¯so ≤  and ptx ≥ δ), the
minimum required transmit power Pmin can be computed
by replacing pmaxtx in (14) with δ and solving the obtained
equality w.r.t. P . This comes from the Pareto optimality
indicated above and the fact that increasing P would
effectively expand the feasible region. If extra antennas
may be added, the decreasing rate of Pmin is most
significant for small N . For the special case δ = 0.5,
it can be proved that Pmin decreases inverse linearly as
N goes large, using [25, Eq. 6.2]. As shown in Fig. 2,
this inverse linear behavior holds for a wide range of δ
(here, the dotted lines are properly scaled inverse linear
curves, shown for reference).
B. Throughput Optimization and Analysis
Having maximized ptx for a given Rs, from (11) and (14),
the optimal message rate that maximizes the throughput is
given by
R∗s = arg max
Rs>0
ηNAE = arg max
Rs>0
pmaxtx (Rs)×Rs , (17)
and the corresponding maximal throughput is given by
η∗NAE = p
max
tx (R
∗
s)×R∗s . (18)
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Fig. 3. Throughput of the NAE scheme versus the message rate for different
numbers of transmit antennas, with P = 20 dB and  = 0.01.
From (14) and (17), it can be shown that if Rs is too small,
even though ptx may be high (i.e., close to one), the value
of ηNAE is still very small; whereas, if Rs is too large, the
value of ptx and therefore ηNAE will also become very small.
Moreover, by differentiating ηNAE = pmaxtx (Rs) × Rs w.r.t.
Rs, one can verify that the derivative is first positive and then
negative with increasing Rs; thus R∗s is unique. As such, even
if the objective function is non-concave, as shown in Fig. 3,
we still can solve the derivative to find R∗s numerically.
Though it seems difficult to find a general closed-form
solution for (17), we can obtain an accurate approximation in
the high SNR region. Specifically, as derived in Appendix C,
when P →∞, we have
R∗s ≈
1
N ln (2)
W0
 exp (1)N !PN(√
λ (,N) + 1
)2N
− 1
 , (19)
6where W0 (·) is the principle branch of the Lambert-W func-
tion and λ (,N) is defined in (13).
From (19) and [26, Eq. 65], we know that R∗s increases
with P . Therefore, from (15) and (16), we can observe that for
the throughput-maximizing scheme, as P → ∞, the optimal
power allocation ratio Φ∗ and the added rate redundancy
R∗e = R
∗
b −R∗s converge to
lim
P→∞
Φ∗ =
1√
λ (,N) + 1
, (20)
lim
P→∞
R∗e = log2
(√
λ (,N) + 1
)
. (21)
Furthermore, based on (19), a high SNR throughput approx-
imation for the NAE scheme is derived in Appendix D, and
is given as follows:
η∗NAE () ≈ η=1NAE − ηlossNAE () , (22)
where
η=1NAE =log2(P )−
1
N
log2(ln(P ))+
1
N
log2((N−1)!), (23)
ηlossNAE()=2 log2
(√
λ(,N)+1
)
. (24)
Here η=1NAE is the high SNR throughput approximation for
the NAE scheme when the system is operating without any
secrecy constraint (i.e.,  = 1), while ηlossNAE () reflects the
throughput loss for realizing secure transmission. Interestingly,
the throughput loss in (24) is independent of P and this is a
direct consequence of the zero-noise assumption of Eve.
From (22)-(24), several observations can be made:
• The benefits of adding extra transmit antennas are two-
fold: i) the system is more capable of achieving a larger
throughput, ii) the throughput loss for securing the trans-
mission will be reduced. However, the benefits in terms of
reducing ηlossNAE () by adding extra antennas are limited,
i.e.,
lim
N→∞
ηlossNAE () = 2 log2
(√
ln
(
1

)
+ 1
)
,
which depends only on , as we may expect.
• Even in the high SNR region, the second term in (23)
is usually insignificant due to the double logarithm.
Therefore, to achieve a specified target throughput, the
additional power cost for imposing or strengthening the
secrecy constraint can be approximated as
∆NAEP (1, 2, N) (dB) (25)
≈
20 log10
(√
λ (2, N) + 1
)
if 2 ≤ 1 = 1 ,
10
N−1 log10
(
1
2
)
if 2 ≤ 1  1 ,
which is independent of the targeted throughput. It is clear
that the power cost in both cases in (25) can be effectively
reduced by adding extra transmit antennas.
In Fig. 4, we show that the throughput approximation
in (22) is quite accurate by comparing with the exact maximal
throughput, which is obtained by numerically optimizing (17).
When the secrecy constraint is strengthened, in order to
maintain a specified target throughput, for N = 4, the first
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Fig. 4. Throughput of the NAE scheme and the high SNR approximation
versus the transmit power for different secrecy constraints, with N = 4.
arrow shows that with 1 = 1 and 2 = 0.1, the additional
power cost is 9.14 dB, while the second arrow suggests that
with 1 = 0.1 and 2 = 0.01, the additional power cost is
3.55 dB. These two values are very close to the approximation
provided in (25). Note that when N is very small (e.g.,
N = 2), the approximation in (22) becomes inaccurate due to
the approximation procedure used in Appendix D and a better
approximation can be obtained by plugging (19) into (18).
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
WITH ADAPTIVE ENCODER
In this section, we consider the scenario where Alice
dynamically adjusts the system parameters: Rb, Rs and Φ
for each realization of the channel to Bob h. In other words,
Alice performs adaptive encoding (AE). As before, the target
is to maximize the throughput under the secrecy constraint
given by a maximum allowable secrecy outage probability . In
particular, the values of Rb, Rs and Φ are dynamically chosen
to meet the requirement on the secrecy outage probability for
each transmission, i.e., pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h)) ≤ . This
design will in turn satisfy the requirement on the overall se-
crecy outage probability. With the secrecy constraint satisfied,
the problem of maximizing the throughput is equivalent to
maximizing Rs (h) for each h. Intuitively, the AE scheme can
achieve a larger throughput compared with the NAE scheme,
but demands a higher complexity.
A. Message Rate Maximization
From (8), the problem of maximizing Rs (h) for each h is
given by
max
Rb(h),Rs(h),Φ(h)
Rs (h)
s.t. pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h)) ≤  ,
Rb (h) ≤ log2
(
1 + PΦ (h) ||h||2) ,
0 ≤ Rs (h) ≤ Rb (h) ,
0 ≤ Φ (h) ≤ 1 , (26)
where the second constraint eliminates the capacity outages at
the intended receiver.
7The solution to (26) is presented as follows, whilst the
derivation is relegated to Appendix E.
Proposition 2. With an adaptive encoder, for a given realiza-
tion of the intended channel h and under the secrecy constraint
pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h)) ≤ , the maximal message rate
in (26) is given by:
Rmaxs (h) (27)
=2 log2
(√
Pλ (,N)||h||2 −√P ||h||2 − λ (,N) + 1
λ (,N)− 1
)
,
where λ (,N) is defined in (13). The corresponding optimal
system parameters are given by:
µ∗ = λ (,N)/P , (28)
Φ∗ (h) =
√
λ (,N)
(
1 + 1−λ(,N)P ||h||2
)
− 1
λ (,N)− 1 , (29)
R∗b (h) = log2
(
1 + PΦ∗ (h) ||h||2) . (30)
From (27)-(30), several observations can be made:
• Intuitively, we may expect that a positive message rate
can always be achieved by properly adjusting the trans-
mission system; thus, it may not be necessary to in-
troduce the on-off transmission protocol. However, the
derivation in Appendix E shows that after guarantee-
ing the secrecy performance, a positive Rs (h) can be
achieved only when ||h||2 > λ (,N)/P . In other words,
when Bob’s channel is not sufficiently good, a positive
Rs (h) and the required secrecy performance cannot be
achieved simultaneously, no matter how Alice adjusts the
power allocation or encoding. Therefore, to maximize the
throughput whilst guaranteeing the required secrecy level,
on-off transmission with µ = λ (,N)/P is introduced,
as stated in (28).
• The optimal power allocation ratio Φ∗ (h) in (29) de-
creases with increasing P , approaching the constant:
lim
P→∞
Φ∗ (h) =
1√
λ (,N) + 1
, (31)
which is independent of h and is identical to that for the
NAE scheme in (20). This convergence suggests that in
the high SNR region, near optimal performance can be
obtained by employing a non-adaptive power allocation
strategy.
• With optimized power allocation, Rb (h) is set to the
instantaneous capacity of Bob’s channel to guarantee suc-
cessful decoding, as shown in (30). From (27) and (30),
we can observe that as P → ∞, the added rate redun-
dancy Re (h) = Rb (h)−Rs (h) converges to
lim
P→∞
Re (h) = log2
(√
λ (,N) + 1
)
, (32)
which is independent of h and is identical to that for the
NAE scheme in (21).
• Furthermore, as shown in Appendix E, Rmaxs (h) in (27)
is always achieved when pso (Rb (h) , Rs (h) ,Φ (h)) = 
and this implies that the overall secrecy outage probability
in (9) is also guaranteed to be p¯so = .
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Fig. 5. Optimal power allocation ratios of the NAE and AE schemes versus
the transmit power, with N = 8 and  = 0.01.
Fig. 5 illustrates our analysis, showing Φ∗ (h) for the AE
scheme for different h. The value of Φ∗ for the NAE scheme
is also shown for comparison and it is found by numerically
optimizing Rs in (17), followed by plugging it into (15). As we
may expect, the optimal power allocation ratios all converge to
the same limit with increasing P . This observation is similar
to the one in [10] where the channel gain was found to be
irrelevant in finding the optimal power allocation in the high
SNR region for maximizing the ergodic secrecy rate in fast
fading channels. However, besides the similarity, the difference
is also significant. In the high SNR region, the optimal power
allocation ratio that maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate for fast
fading channels [10] is around 0.5, while the limiting value of
Φ∗ (h) in (31) that maximizes the throughput for slow fading
channels depends strongly on the required security level  and
the number of transmit antennas N .
B. Throughput Performance Analysis
By (7) and (27), the throughput for the optimized AE
scheme is given by
η∗AE = Eh [Rmaxs (h)] . (33)
Though it seems difficult to find a closed-form expression,
similar to the NAE case, progress can be made by appealing to
the high SNR region. Specifically, as P → ∞, the following
approximation is derived in Appendix F:
η∗AE ≈ log2
(
P
λ(,N)
)
+
ψ(N)
ln(2)
(34)
+ 2 log2
( √
λ(,N)√
λ(,N)+1
)
Γ˜
(
N,
λ(,N)
P
)
+
(λ(,N)/P )
N
N2(N − 1)! ln(2)2F2
(
N,N ;N+1,N+1;−λ(,N)
P
)
,
where λ (,N) is defined in (13), ψ (N) is the digamma
function, and 2F2 (·, ·; ·, ·; ·) is the generalized hypergeometric
function [27, Eq. 9.14.1].
8To gain more insights, as shown in Appendix F, when
P →∞, (34) is further approximated as
η∗AE () ≈ η=1AE − ηlossAE () , (35)
where
η=1AE = log2 (P ) +
ψ (N)
ln(2)
, (36)
ηlossAE () = 2 log2
(√
λ (,N) + 1
)
. (37)
Here η=1AE is the high SNR throughput approximation for the
AE scheme without any secrecy constraint, which coincides
with the high SNR approximation of the ergodic capacity
of the MISO Rayleigh fading channel [28], while ηlossAE ()
reflects the throughput loss incurred by enforcing the secrecy
constraint.
From (35)-(37), several observations can be made:
• In the high SNR region, the throughput loss for imposing
the secrecy constraint in (37) is independent of P and it
is identical to the throughput loss for the NAE scheme
in (24). The throughput loss in (37) is actually twice the
limiting value of the rate redundancy in (32). This can
be explained by noting that in the high SNR region, the
transmit threshold in (28) is close to zero and, in addition
to the rate redundancy in (32), the transmission system
also suffers a power loss since a certain fraction of power
is used to generate artificial noise, as shown in (31). It is
interesting that this power loss leads to a data rate loss
which is identical with the rate redundancy in (32).
• In the high SNR region, to achieve a specified target
throughput, the additional power cost for imposing or
strengthening the secrecy constraint can be approximated
from (35) and the results are identical to those for the
NAE scheme in (25). However, although the NAE and AE
schemes suffer the same power cost when imposing the
same secrecy constraint, the AE scheme still outperforms
the NAE scheme in terms of the throughput performance.
This is due to the fact that when the secrecy constraint
is removed, the AE scheme is designed to achieve a
better throughput performance, compared with the NAE
scheme. Specifically, when  = 1, for both schemes, all
the transmit power is allocated to the information-bearing
signal and the data will be transmitted without wiretap
coding. In this case, the NAE scheme still chooses a
constant rate to transmit and the transmit threshold is
set to the minimum required effective channel gain to
support the selected rate; while the AE scheme always
transmits at the instantaneous capacity of Bob’s channel
and the transmit threshold is therefore set to zero.
In Fig. 6, we show that the throughput approximation
in (35) is quite accurate by comparing with the exact max-
imal throughput, which is obtained by numerically evaluat-
ing (33). The additional power cost analysis is confirmed by
the examples therein. Note that when N is very small (e.g.,
N = 2), (35) becomes less accurate due to the approximation
procedure used in Appendix F and (34) provides a better
approximation.
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C. Throughput Gain of Adaptation: AE over NAE
In the following, we analyze the throughput gain brought
by doing adaptation. With the throughput approximations for
the NAE and AE schemes in (22) and (35), in the high SNR
region, the throughput gain can be approximated by
η∗AE − η∗NAE (38)
≈ 1
N
log2 (ln (P )) +
(
ψ (N)
ln (2)
− 1
N
log2 ((N − 1)!)
)
.
With this approximation, several observations can be made:
• In the high SNR region, the throughput gain increases
with P , albeit very slowly, as can be seen from the double
logarithm in the first term of (38).
• It turns out that as N increases, the second term in (38)
(i.e., the P -independent term) increases slowly. The first
term, on the other hand, decreases very fast with N
(i.e., linearly), and moreover, this term becomes dominant
when P is large. These observations imply that for high
SNR, the throughput gap between the NAE and AE
schemes shrinks when the number of antennas grows.
Consequently, for systems operating at high SNRs, if
the number of antennas is not small, it may be more
preferable to employ the NAE scheme rather than the
AE scheme, due to the complexity saving.
• The throughput gain approximation in (38) is independent
of the secrecy constraint . This can be explained by
noting that in the high SNR region, the NAE and AE
schemes incur the same throughput loss for imposing the
secrecy constraint, as shown in (22) and (35).
Fig. 7 compares the approximation in (38) with the exact
throughput gain. It is clear that the exact throughput gain
decreases with increasing N . Note that the variation in the
throughput gain is not very significant over a wide range of ,
though the gain does decrease with strengthening the secrecy
constraint (i.e., reducing ). We note that the approximation
is not very accurate, since the throughput gain is relatively
small and thus the approximation error in (38) is relatively
pronounced. What is important is that, as stated above, our
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Fig. 7. Throughput gain of the AE scheme over the NAE scheme and the
high SNR approximation versus the secrecy constraint for different number
of transmit antennas, with P = 40 dB.
analysis accurately predicts the varying trends of the exact
throughput gain.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the design of artificial-noise-aided
secure multi-antenna transmission in slow fading channels. We
provided explicit design solutions to the secrecy-constrained
throughput-maximization problem with either non-adaptive
transmission (i.e., the NAE scheme) or adaptive transmission
(i.e., the AE scheme). To facilitate practical system design,
we examined the additional power cost for achieving a higher
secrecy level for both schemes and analyzed the throughput
gain of the AE scheme over the NAE scheme in the high
SNR region. Our analysis obtained new insights on the design
of artificial-noise-aided secure multi-antenna transmission in
slow fading channels.
APPENDIX
A. Proposition 1
In this proof, we derive the optimal values of the system
parameters Rb, µ and Φ to maximize the transmit probability
ptx in (12) (i.e., minimize the average delay). We first optimize
Rb and µ for a given Φ, and then optimize Φ. The message
rate Rs is assumed to be at a prescribed value.
As we discussed at the beginning of Section III, for the NAE
scheme, the overall secrecy outage probability in (9) reduces
to (8). For a given Φ, from (8), it is clear that the secrecy
constraint in (12) can be satisfied by choosing a large enough
Rb. Substituting (8) into the secrecy constraint in (12) (i.e.,
p¯so (Rb,Φ) ≤ ) and solving w.r.t. Rb, we have
Rb ≥ Rs + log2
(
1 +
λΦ
1− Φ
)
=: Rminb ,
where λ is defined in (13) and its parameters are omitted for
brevity.
To minimize the average delay, the transmit probability ptx
in (6) needs to be maximized. From (6), it is clear that ptx is
maximized when the transmit threshold µ is set to its smallest
possible value. From the second constraint in (12), which
eliminates capacity outages at Bob, we know that for a given
Φ, µ should be set to
µmin :=
1
PΦ
(
2R
min
b − 1
)
,
in order to maximize the transmit probability, whilst satisfying
the secrecy constraint.
Substituting µmin into (6), the corresponding ptx is given
by
ptx (Φ) = Γ˜ (N,ω (Φ)) , (39)
where
ω (Φ) =
ρ
1− Φ +
%
Φ
, ρ =
2Rsλ
P
, % =
2Rs − 1
P
. (40)
Since the regularized upper incomplete gamma function
decreases with its second parameter, it is clear that ptx (Φ)
in (39) achieves its maximum when ω (Φ) takes its minimum.
Note that ω (Φ) is a convex function of Φ; thus, by solving
the derivative of ω (Φ) w.r.t. Φ, the optimal power allocation
ratio can be found as
Φ∗ =
√
%√
ρ+
√
%
,
and the corresponding maximal transmit probability pmaxtx is
given by
pmaxtx := ptx (Φ
∗) = Γ˜
(
N, (
√
ρ+
√
%)
2
)
.
Summarizing the obtained results, we have Proposition 1.
B. Monotonicity of Quantity in (13)
In this proof, we show that λ in (13) decreases with
increasing N . To this end, we temporarily assume that N is
a continuous variable. Taking the derivative of λ w.r.t. N , we
have
dλ
dN
= 
1
1−N
(
1 +
ln ()
N − 1
)
− 1 . (41)
To show that the above derivative is negative, we need to show
that the expression in the bracket is smaller than 
1
N−1 . Since
the secrecy constraint  is smaller than one, we know that
ln()
N−1 < 0. From the inequality 1 + x < e
x for x < 0, letting
x = ln()N−1 , we see that the quantity in the bracket in (41)
satisfies
1 +
ln ()
N − 1 < exp
(
ln ()
N − 1
)
= 
1
N−1 .
Thus, we know that the derivative in (41) is negative. Since
the discrete N is just a sampled version of the continuous N ,
the monotonic properties are the same. We then know that λ
in (13) decreases with increasing N .
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C. Approximation of Optimal Message Rate in (19)
In this proof, we derive an approximation for the optimal
message rate R∗s in (17). From the discussions after (18),
we know that one can solve the derivative of the throughput
ηNAE w.r.t. Rs to find R∗s . However, the equality obtained
by setting the derivative to zero is quite complicated and
seems not solvable. Hence, we consider first approximating the
throughput and then optimizing the approximated throughput.
The details can be found as follows.
Using the inequality 2Rs > 2Rs−1, a lower bound to ηNAE
can be given by
ηNAE ≥ log2 (x)× Γ˜ (N, ςx) =: ηLBNAE , (42)
where x = 2Rs , ς = 1P
(√
λ+ 1
)2
and λ is defined in (13).
As P → ∞, it is clear that ς → 0. Using the series
representation of the regularized upper incomplete gamma
function [27, Eq. 8.352.4.*], we expand ηLBNAE in (42) as
ηLBNAE = log2 (x) e
−ςx
N−1∑
k=0
(ςx)
k
k!
= log2 (x) e
−ςx
(
eςx −
∞∑
k=N
(ςx)
k
k!
)
= log2 (x)
(
1−
∞∑
l=0
(−ςx)l
l!
∞∑
k=N
(ςx)
k
k!
)
(43)
= log2 (x)
(
1− (ςx)
N
N !
+O (ςN+1)) , (44)
where in (43) we used the standard series expansion of the
exponential function.
Ignoring the high order terms in the above series represen-
tation and taking the derivative w.r.t. x, we have
dη˜LBNAE
dx
=
ςN
x ln (2)N !
(
N !ς−N − xN (1 + ln (xN))) .
We then set the above derivative to zero and solve the obtained
equality w.r.t. x. After summarizing the obtained results, we
have the approximation in (19).
D. High SNR Throughput Approximation in (22)
In (19), we have obtained an approximation for the optimal
message rate R∗s in (17). Plugging an approximation for (19)
into a lower bound to the throughput in (44) and ignoring the
high order terms, we can get an elegant approximation for
the maximal throughput η∗NAE. The details can be found as
follows.
In [26, Eq. 65], a series expansion is provided for the
principle branch of the Lambert-W function W0 (·), and it
states that as x→∞,
W0 (x) = ln
(
x
ln (x)
)
+O
(
ln (ln (x))
ln (x)
)
.
Thus, as P →∞, by ignoring the high order terms, (19) can
be further approximated as
R˜∗s =
1
N
log2

N !PN
(
√
λ+1)
2N
ln
(
exp(1)N !PN
(
√
λ+1)
2N
)
 ,
where λ is defined in (13). Note that as P → ∞, 2R˜
∗
s
P → 0.
Substituting the above approximation into the throughput
lower bound in (44), we have
η∗NAE ≈ R˜∗s
1−O
(2R˜∗s
P
)N .
Taking the leading order term yields
η∗NAE ≈ log2 (P )−
1
N
log2 (ln (P )) +
1
N
log2 (N !)
− 1
N
log2
(
N +O
(
1
ln (P )
))
− 2 log2
(√
λ+ 1
)
.
Here O
(
1
ln(P )
)
= 1ln(P )
(
1 + ln (N !)− 2N ln
(√
λ+ 1
))
,
which can be ignored for high P , thereby giving (22).
E. Proposition 2
In this proof, we derive the optimal values of the system
parameters Rb, Rs and Φ to maximize the message rate Rs
in (26) for a given realization of the intended channel h, whilst
satisfying the secrecy constraint. (Note that for the AE scheme,
the design parameters Rb, Rs and Φ are intrinsically functions
of h.) We first optimize Rb and Rs for a given Φ, and then
optimize Φ.
For a given Φ, to eliminate capacity outages at Bob (i.e.,
the second constraint in (26)), Alice sets Rb to the capacity
of Bob’s channel:
Rb (Φ) = Cb = log2
(
1 + PΦ||h||2) .
For a given Φ, if Alice decides to transmit with Rb (Φ) above,
and with Rs < Rb (Φ), the secrecy outage probability for this
transmission is given by (8) as
pso(Rb(Φ),Rs,Φ)=
(
1+
(
2Rb(Φ)−Rs−1
)(Φ−1−1
N−1
))1−N
,
which simply increases with increasing Rs. Thus, the maximal
Rs will be obtained when the secrecy constraint in (26) is
met with equality, i.e., pso (Rb (Φ) , Rs,Φ) = . Solving this
equality gives
Rs (Φ) = log2
(
1 + τΦ
1 + λΦ1−Φ
)
, (45)
which is a function of Φ, τ = P ||h||2 and λ is defined in (13).
From (45), we see that when τ ≤ λ (equivalently,
||h||2 ≤ λP ), it is impossible to adjust Φ ∈ (0, 1) to achieve
a positive Rs. For the alternative case, when τ > λ
(i.e., ||h||2 > λP ), the range of Φ which can guarantee that
Rs (Φ) > 0 is (0, 1 − λτ ). Henceforth, we focus on the case
where τ > λ.
11
Since Rs (Φ) in (45) is non-concave on Φ and the loga-
rithm function is monotonic, we then maximize an equivalent
objective function 1+τΦ
1+ λΦ1−Φ
, which is concave on Φ ∈ (0, 1) for
τ > λ. Solving the derivative of 1+τΦ
1+ λΦ1−Φ
w.r.t. Φ leads to
Φ∗ =
√
τλ(τ − λ+ 1)− τ
τλ− τ ,
while it is also confirmed that 0 < Φ∗ < 1− λτ when τ > λ.
Summarizing the obtained results, we have Proposition 2.
F. High SNR Throughput Approximation in (35)
Having optimized the message rate for each realization of
the intended channel, the average throughput can be computed
by averaging the maximum message rate in (27) over all
channel realizations. Plugging (27) into (33), we have
η∗AE =2
∫ ∞
λ
P
log2
(√
Pλr−√Pr−(λ−1)
λ−1
)
e−r
rN−1
(N−1)!dr, (46)
where λ is defined in (13) and the lower limits comes from
the transmit threshold in (28).
It seems difficult to find a closed-form expression for the
above integral; instead, we appeal to the high SNR region.
The quantity λ− 1 is independent of P ; thus, it is negligible
compared with Pr when P is large. Therefore, by omitting
the quantity λ− 1 under the second square root sign in (46),
we have
η∗AE≈2 log2
( √
P√
λ+ 1
)
Γ˜
(
N,
λ
P
)
+
∫ ∞
λ
P
log2(r)e
−r r
N−1
(N−1)!dr
=2 log2
( √
λ√
λ+ 1
)
Γ˜
(
N,
λ
P
)
+
λ
P
T
(
3,N, λP
)
ln(2)(N−1)! , (47)
where we used to the integral identities in [27, Eq. 4.358.1.6]
and [29, Eq. 29], and T (3, N, x) is a special case for the
Meijer G-function [27, Eq. 9.301] with parameters:
T (3, N, x) = G3,02,3
(
x
∣∣∣∣ 0, 0−1,−1, N − 1
)
.
By [29, Eq. 37 & 38], (47) can be equivalently expressed as
η∗AE ≈ log2
(
P
λ
)
+ 2 log2
( √
λ√
λ+ 1
)
Γ˜
(
N,
λ
P
)
+
(λ/P )
N
(N − 1)! ln(2)
∞∑
k=0
(−λ/P )k
k! (N + k)
2 +
ψ (N)
ln(2)
.
We then note that 1
(N+k)2
= 1N2
(N)k(N)k
(N+1)k(N+1)k
, where
(N)k =
(N+k−1)!
(N−1)! for k ≥ 0 is the Pochhammer symbol.
Thus, the infinite summation can be expressed in terms of
a hypergeometric function [27, Eq. 9.14.1] and we have the
result in (34). By definition, with a large P , the regularized
incomplete gamma function in the second term of the equation
above is close to one while the third term is with order
O (P−N); thus, we have the result in (35).
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